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Abstract
Investigation of tool-using behaviours has long been a means by which to explore causal
reasoning in children and nonhuman animals. Much of the recent research has focused on
the “Aesop’s Fable” paradigm, in which objects must be dropped into water to bring a float-
ing reward within reach. An underlying problem with these, as with many causal reasoning
studies, is that functionality information and reward history are confounded: a tool that is
functionally useful is also rewarded, while a tool that is not functionally useful is not
rewarded. It is therefore not possible to distinguish between behaviours motivated by func-
tional understanding of the properties of the objects involved, and those influenced by
reward-history. Here, we devised an adapted version of the Aesop’s Fable paradigm which
decouples functionality information and reward history by making use of situations in which
the use of a particular tool should have enabled a subject to obtain (or not obtain) a reward,
but the outcome was affected by the context. Children aged 4–11 were given experience of
a range of tools that varied independently in whether they were functional or non-functional
and rewarded or non-rewarded. They were then given the opportunity to choose which tools
they would like to use in a test trial, thereby providing an assessment of whether they relied
on information about functionality or the reward history associated with the object or a com-
bination of the two. Children never significantly used reward history to drive their choices of
tools, while the influence of functionality information increased with age, becoming dominant
by age 7. However, not all children behaved in a consistent manner, and even by 10 years
of age, only around a third exclusively used functionality as a basis for their decision-making.
These findings suggest that from around the age of 7-years, children begin to emphasize
functionality information when learning in novel situations, even if competing reward infor-
mation is available, but that even in the oldest age-group, most children did not exclusively
use functionality information.
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Introduction
“Causality is a constraint common to all ecological niches” ([1], p.645). All environments,
however diverse, contain cause-effect relationships. Being able to detect and use these causal
links to predict and manipulate surroundings is therefore highly adaptive. Much research on
how individuals understand these relationships concentrates on causality in the domain of folk
physics, often using means-end or tool-use methodologies.
Two and a half thousand years after Aesop’s classic fable of the thirsty crow dropping stones
into a pitcher to raise the level of the water inside, the “Aesop’s fable” paradigm has become a
popular means by which to assess causal cognition in birds and children (e.g. [2, 3–6]). In this
paradigm, subjects need to drop sinking objects into a tube filled with water, causing the water
level to rise and bringing a floating reward within reach. While most subjects tested proved
capable of item-dropping behaviours, variants of the task were developed to explore what indi-
viduals know and learn about water displacement. These tests have mainly fallen into two cate-
gories: substrate-choice tasks, which explore the importance of functional context, and object-
choice tasks, which explore the importance of functional tools.
In substrate-choice tasks, individuals are presented with two tubes. One is filled with water,
with a reward floating on the surface. The other tube has an identical reward at the same level,
but is either filled with a non-displaceable substrate (e.g. sawdust or sand [2]) or is empty, with
the reward attached to the inside of the tube (“air-filled” tube [7]). To obtain a reward, individ-
uals must therefore choose to drop sinking objects into the functional (i.e. water-filled) tube
over the non-functional one [8]. In object-choice tasks, individuals are presented with a single
tube of water and a selection of items to choose from. Half the objects are “functional”: they
sink and displace enough water to cause the floating reward to rise. The other half are less- or
non-functional: they will either displace significantly less water, or none at all. Individuals
should therefore choose to drop the functional objects in order to retrieve the reward (e.g. [2,
7, 9]).
Successful performance on causal tests such as the Aesop’s fable task suggest some compre-
hension of cause and effect. However, this can take different forms. An organism can either
recognise a link between cause and effect (i.e. they can know that x causes y), or they can
understand that a mechanism ties cause and effect (i.e. they know why x causes y). The distinc-
tion between these two levels of cause-effect understanding can be considered as the difference
between associative learning and causal reasoning.
Associative learning is the process by which a stimulus becomes associated with an outcome
when the two co-occur with both high temporal contiguity and high contingency (e.g. [10]).
This learning system has evolved as a simple and reliable mechanism to allow an individual to
react to reliable co-occurring events in the environment. It is therefore a highly efficient and
effective cognitive process with which to learn about cause-effect relationships (e.g. [11]). In
contrast, individuals employing causal reasoning represent causal relationships not just by the
co-occurrence of two events (or action and outcome), but as a causal event or action and a
resulting effect. This form of reasoning involves the understanding that a mechanism exists by
which the cause leads to the effect, and at a more sophisticated level, what that mechanism is.
On a cognitive level, this form of causal understanding is very different from that seen in
associative learning: predictions of outcomes are based on a model of how the world works,
rather than statistical regularity [12]. In theory, the two can also produce distinct behaviours.
Individuals that know that a cause leads to an effect will be able to act appropriately should
that exact situation re-occur in the future. However, subjects that understand why a cause
leads to an effect will be able to generalise their learning to other situations based on the same
mechanism. Still, in practice, it is often very difficult to assess exactly what has been learned. In
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the vast majority of causal scenarios, the effect closely follows the cause (contiguousness).
Cause and effect are also highly contingent: one is unlikely to occur in the absence of the
other. This makes it difficult to disentangle whether the subject has formed an associative link
between cause and effect, and are simply likely to repeat an action that has previously been
rewarded, or whether they understand how these two factors are linked and thus rely on infor-
mation about the current functionality of an object.
This limitation is especially pertinent in tool-use studies—including the Aesop’s fable para-
digm. When a tool is used by an individual to successfully obtain a reward, the subject can
acquire two types of information. First, that this tool is rewarded, i.e. that it leads to reward.
Second, that this tool is “functional”, i.e. why it leads to reward. In the vast majority of labora-
tory studies on causal reasoning, the functional items are also reliably those that are linked to
reward. Since information about functionality is confounded with reward history, it is impos-
sible to differentiate between function and reward-history-based learning.
In the Aesop’s Fable task, associative learning and causal reasoning are confounded: the
objects that are functional are also the ones whose use is consistently linked with reward.
These objects may therefore become attractive for use by virtue of mere association with
reward, rather than being chosen for their utility. One way in which researchers have
attempted to distinguish between causal reasoning and associative learning is by analysing
only the first trial of an individual’s first exposure to a problem [13]. This is a useful method to
assess pre-existing knowledge or understanding, but brings problems of its own. First, if an
individual chooses an appropriate tool on their first trial, the contribution of previous learning
to this performance is unknown. It remains possible that associative learning from previous
experiences in highly similar situations has been generalised to this new context [14]. Second,
if an individual fails to choose an appropriate tool on their first choice, this is not necessarily
informative as to their capacity to understand the relevant functionality. At most, one can con-
clude that, in the context of this particular choice, the subject does not already have such an
understanding. By not allowing repeated exposure to the problem, such experiments only par-
tially rule out the influence of previous reward history, while completely precluding the influ-
ence of learning about the physical rules involved.
In order to investigate understanding of functionality we must therefore differentiate causal
reasoning from associative learning based on reward history, while also recognising the impor-
tance of learning and experience in the formation of causal understanding. This requires
exposing individuals to situations in which functional items do not result in obtaining a
reward, while non-functional items do so. These situations arise when external circumstances
interfere with the link between the functionality of a tool and the receipt of a reward. Examples
of these types of experiences are in fact relatively common in everyday life. One can have a tool
that is usually functional (for example, a metal hammer) that does not achieve the desired out-
come because of the context of use (a bent nail) but would have been successful in more stan-
dard circumstances. Meanwhile one can have a usually non-functional tool (an inflatable
hammer) that succeeds in achieving the desired outcome because of the context of use (for
example, a nail going into a large, pre-drilled hole) but would not have been successful in more
standard circumstances. In these circumstances, a “functionality learner” would learn about
the functional properties of these tools through experience (the metal hammer exerts a large
percussive pressure on the nail, the inflatable hammer exerts very little pressure). On the other
hand, a “reward-history learner” would learn the reward associations. If both individuals were
later given a choice of the two tools in a “standard” context, this same learning environment
would predict different choices.
The current experiment was designed to assess the relative contribution of causal reasoning
and associative learning to choices in an Aesop’s fable task in 4–11 year old children. In
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particular, we examined how the influence of these two competing approaches may shift as the
children get older. To investigate this, the experience of being rewarded for using a particular
tool was uncoupled from whether or not this tool was functional. For example, using a func-
tional tool (i.e. an object that sinks) could lead to the experience of not being rewarded (the
context prevented the water level from rising). Conversely, using a non-functional tool (i.e. an
object that floats) could lead to obtaining a reward (serendipitously provided by the context).
These experiences give information as to the functional properties of the tools (the children
can observe that one object sinks and displaces water), but in a manner that does not confound
this information with reward history. Which objects children then choose to use in a transfer
task, where the context was more standard, would indicate whether their experience with the
tool taught them information about the tool’s functionality, or the tool-reward association.
From the pattern of performance obtained across a number of situations varying in reward
and functionality information, it should be possible to statistically model the relative contribu-
tion of reward- and function-based information to children’s choices. In a separate analysis,
we can also identify what proportion of children of different ages are exclusively using a spe-
cific type or combination of information to guide their choices.
Previous research suggests that children are capable of forming an understanding of cause
and effect from a very young age. Infants from 8 months can form expectations from complex
statistical regularities [15–17], and are able to act on such information in a goal directed man-
ner from 2.5 years of age [18]. Children of 3–4 years are furthermore able to explicitly identify
action-outcome relationships from covariation and contiguity when no obvious mechanism of
action is shown [19–22]. It is therefore likely that children of at least 4 should be able to learn
to identify a successful course of action using associative learning. However, while perfor-
mance improves gradually from around 5-years, children do not reliably pass a number of
complex tool using tasks, including the Aesop’s fable, until the age of around 8–10 years [3,
23–27]. This may imply that these tasks involve more complex levels of associative learning
than those previously used. Such an account would suggest that the gradual increase in perfor-
mance with age in the Aesop’s fable task seen in previous studies [3, 23] may reflect a growing
sophistication in associative learning. In the current study, this would predict that right from
the youngest age children would rely on association with reward to guide their choices, becom-
ing more successful with age. This pattern would be observed as a consistent tendency for sta-
tistical models emphasizing reward-information to be the best fit with children’s behaviour,
with the degree of fit increasing with age.
Alternatively, it is possible that the type of information used to solve the Aesop’s fable task
may change over time. Cheke and colleagues [3] asked children to describe what they thought
was happening in a modified version of the test. The youngest participants mostly offered no
explanation at all. However, the proportion of individuals able to describe the cause-effect rela-
tionship (i.e. state that cause led to effect) remained relatively stable from around the age of 5.
At around 7-8-years, descriptive explanations became outweighed by attempts at mechanistic
explanations (i.e. statements of why cause led to effect). While the precise mechanism given by
the children was not always correct, the effort to provide such an account suggests that partici-
pants of this age may be emphasizing functionality-based information in their learning. It is
therefore possible to hypothesize that while the youngest children (e.g. 4–5 years) may be
unable to identify cause-effect relationships in the Aesop’s fable task, children of intermediate
age (5-7-years) may rely on a reward-based associative information. This in turn would be
replaced by choices driven by functionality information around the age of 7 and upwards. In
the current study, this would be observed as a change with age in the ability of different statisti-
cal models to fit children’s behaviour. In the youngest children, no model would significantly
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fit the data, then models emphasizing reward and functionality information would best predict
behaviour in intermediate and older children respectively.
Materials and methods
Ethics statement
This study was approved by the University of Cambridge Psychology Research Ethics Com-
mittee (pre.2013.109) and conducted under the European Research Council Executive Agency
Ethics Team (application: 339993-CAUSCOG-ERR). Informed written consent was given by
the parents of each child before they took part in the experiment.
Participants
189 children aged 4 to 11-years were recruited from five schools around Cambridgeshire dur-
ing the 2014–2015 school year. Six subjects (3 males age 4, 5 and 11; 3 females age 9, 5 and 6)
were excluded from the sample due to experimenter error (N = 4), language barrier (N = 1) or
a diagnosis of autism (N = 1). The remaining 184 children (97 boys) were included in the anal-
ysis (4-year-olds: n = 21; 5-year-olds: n = 31; 6-year-olds: n = 35, 7-year-olds: n = 34, 8year-
olds: n = 19, 9-year-olds: n = 19, 10-year-olds: n = 19, 11-year-olds: n = 5). Given the small
sample of 11-year-olds, these data were combined with the 10-year-olds for analysis.
General procedure
Participants were tested at local schools in a separate room or quiet area, and presented with a
series of tasks involving water displacement. They received one session that lasted approxi-
mately 30 minutes.
The experiment was structured into three phases. The training phase familiarised children
with the materials and concepts of the experiment. The exploration phase allowed them to
manipulate a range of objects in the context of a water task. These objects were either func-
tional or non-functional in terms of displacing water, and their use was either rewarded or
unrewarded (depending on the container used). During this phase, children were therefore
able to learn information about functionality and reward about each object in isolation.
Finally, the choice phase allowed the children to choose between specific object pairings in
order to pick which objects to use in a neutral context.
Training phase
During the training phase, participants were introduced to “tokens”. These were made of cork
and metal such that they floated in water but were also magnetic. The children were told that if
they could remove the tokens from inside of a toy they could be exchanged for stickers. The
token was first inserted into a “platform apparatus”–a Perspex box containing a platform held
in place by a magnet. Upon dropping a heavy object into the apparatus through a vertical Per-
spex tube, the platform–as well as the token it supported–was released [2]. Participants were
shown how to obtain the token and encouraged to try themselves. A slightly modified version
of the platform apparatus was then given, where the platform was physically (and obviously)
prevented from being triggered by means of a cardboard wedge. Children were still prompted
to insert objects inside the box to try to get the token out. Upon failure to obtain the reward
they were told that “sometimes things don’t work”.
The magnetic properties of the token were then demonstrated to the children by the intro-
duction of a “fishing rod”. The fishing rod was an 9x6cm plastic square attached to a 6cm
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string glued to a magnet. Subjects were shown that the token can “stick” to the fishing rod and
subsequently encouraged to use it to extract the token floating in a container full of water.
Exploration phase
Materials: Containers. Each element of the exploration phase involved a Perspex con-
tainer filled with water to a level 8cm below the aperture, with a token floating on the surface
of the water. All water containers were attached to a 10x10cm Perspex base, were 18cm tall and
had an inner diameter of 5cm at the open aperture. In each container, the water was coloured
to match the colour of the object it was used with, to facilitate the children’s memory for the
pairing. There were 3 types of container: ‘standard’, ‘always-rewarded’ and ‘never rewarded’.
For counterbalancing reasons, there were two versions of each type of container (Fig 1).
Standard containers were containers in which functional objects would lead to reward, and
non-functional objects would not. The standard containers were either a “Tube”—a clear Per-
spex cylinder—or a “Flask”, a clear laboratory-style flask with a spherical base (maximum
diameter: 11cm) and cylindrical ‘neck’ (length: 12cm). For the “Flask”, the level of the water
was always above the level of the base, such that although this container contains more water
in total, insertion of a functional object would cause the level to rise by the same amount as in
a plain tube.
Always-Rewarded containers were containers which would lead to reward regardless of the
actual functionality of the objects. The “Syringe” was a Perspex tube connected on its side to a
50cm flexible silicon piping linked to a 100ml syringe. When the syringe was manipulated by
the experimenter, extra water was inserted into the tube. The “Piston” was formed of two Per-
spex tubes (internal diameters of 5cm and 4.5cm respectively) tightly fitting into each other.
The inside tube contains water while the outside one acts as a tightly fitted sleeve that can be
moved up and down. Despite their equal length, in the initial position the tubes are not lined
up: instead, the sleeve sticks out by 10cm, bringing the height of the apparatus to 18cm and the
distance from the top of the apparatus to the water-level to 8cm. Manipulation of the outer
Fig 1. Containers used during the exploration and choice phases. Far left: Standard containers in which functional
objects lead to reward, and non-functional objects do not: (A) the “Tube” and (B) the “Flask”. Centre left: Always-
Rewarded containers which will lead to reward regardless of the functionality of the objects: (C) The “Syringe” in
which water is added through a syringe; (D) The “Piston” in which the external sleeve is pulled down, bringing the
aperture closer to the water level. Centre right: Never-Rewarded containers which will never lead to reward regardless
of the functionality of the objects; (E) The “Leaking Tube” in which the water overflows upon each object insertion; (F)
The “Sectioned Tube” in which the token is trapped in a smaller internal tube. Far right: The “Transfer” tube, a
rectangular container.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0193264.g001
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tube by the experimenter would incrementally reduce the distance between the water-level
and the aperture by bringing the tube-aperture closer to the level of the water.
Never-Rewarded containers were containers which would never lead to reward regardless
of the functionality of the objects. The “Leaking Tube” was a Perspex cylinder with two holes
on the side placed just above the initial water level. Two small silicon pipes were inserted in
these holes, allowing any water above that level to flow out freely. Two small cylindrical con-
tainers stand under the piping, collecting the water as it overflows. Raising the water level in
this container would not bring the water level closer to the tube aperture since all displaced
water would leak away, causing the water level to return to its original position. The “Sectioned
Tube” was a standard 5cm diameter Perspex cylinder containing a smaller 2x12cm tube
topped by a lid. The token was placed within the smaller tube, meaning that raising the water
level of the main tube would not move the token.
Materials: Objects. The objects were either functional (displaced water) or non-func-
tional (did not displace water). All objects measured approximately 2x2cm and were of compa-
rable weights; however, they were of different shapes and colours to facilitate discrimination.
For counterbalancing reasons, four versions of each type were created.
Two types of non-functional objects (F-) were presented. Hollow objects were created
using a frame of wire covered in a thin layer of polymer clay. These items would sink but only
displace a negligible amount of water since the water could flow through. Floating objects were
made from polystyrene. There were four non-functional items in total, varying in type, shape
and colour (blue hollow cube, green hollow cube, red floating cylinder, yellow floating cylin-
der). The variety in type (hollow / floating) and appearance (colour / shape) of the objects was
created in order to control for any pre-existing preferences that would affect performance. By
counterbalancing appearance and type of object, we were able to infer that any consistent pat-
tern of behaviour would be due to the functionality of the object, rather than other factors.
All functional objects (F+) were made of polymer clay displacing the water by 0.4cm. The
four unique functional object types varied in shape and colour (red solid cube, yellow solid
cube, green solid cylinder, and blue solid cylinder). This variety was created to match the vari-
ety present in the non-functional objects.
Procedure. The exploration phase gave the opportunity for children to experience four
different function/reward conditions once each (F+R+, F-R+, F+R-, F-R-) through four conse-
cutive exploration trials (Fig 2). Children were split into four groups for counterbalancing pur-
poses. These groups experienced different versions of the objects and containers, and in
different orders, but otherwise went through identical conditions.
The Functional/Rewarded (F+R+) condition paired the functional objects with standard
containers, leading to reward. The Functional/Non-rewarded (F+R-) condition associated
functional objects with never-rewarded containers. The Non-functional / rewarded (F-R+)
condition coupled non-functional objects with always-rewarded containers. Finally, the Non-
functional/Non-rewarded (F-R-) condition combined non-functional objects with standard
containers, and did not lead to reward. Each exploration trial took place as follows: the chil-
dren were given the fishing rod, one type of water container, and one set of objects. Five
objects were provided, all of the same type, colour and shape: the colour of the water matched
the colour of the object. The token was dropped into the water by the experimenter and chil-
dren were given one minute to retrieve it. The starting level of the water was always too low for
the token to be retrieved immediately with the fishing rod. If they did not do so spontaneously,
the children were encouraged to insert the provided objects in the container. Children were
advised to insert all five objects regardless of the outcome of the first insertion. In rewarded tri-
als, insertion of 5 objects was required to bring the token within reach of the fishing rod. In
non-rewarded trials, no quantity of objects would ever bring the token within reach of the
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fishing rod. After each trial, children were shown a card displaying the container and object
they had just used, with a representation of the token either added or not, to represent whether
this combination had led to reward. This card was then visible throughout the remaining
exploration and choice trials.
Choice phase
Materials. The transfer tube was an 18cm tall square container (4x5cm) filled with clear
water up to a height of 8cm from the aperture. The objects given for the children to choose
between were identical to the ones they used during the exploration phase (Fig 1).
Procedure. Once all four trials of the exploration phase were completed, the children
entered the “choice” phase. This started with the presentation of the “transfer tube”, a novel
container filled with clear water. A token was placed in this container, and it was demonstrated
to the children that it was out of reach.
The choice phase contained 6 unique trials opposing two types of objects. Each choice–
referred to hereafter as choice-trials—contrasted different combinations of functionality and
Fig 2. Exploration and choice phases. (A) The exploration phase: Children experienced the four different types of
objects (F+R+, F-R+, F+R-, F-R-) through four consecutive exploration trials. In each trial, five objects are inserted in
the corresponding container, either leading to the acquisition of the reward or not. Each object-container pair has the
same colour. (B) The choice phase: Children have six choices as to which previously experienced objects to use with the
transfer tube: F+R+ vs. F-R-, F+R+ vs F-R+, F+R+ vs F+R-, F-R- vs. F-R+, F-R- vs F+R-, F+R- vs F-R+.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0193264.g002
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reward history: (1) F+R+ vs. F-R-, (2) F+R+ vs F-R+, (3) F+R+ vs F+R-, (4) F-R- vs. F-R+, (5)
F-R- vs F+R-, (6) F+R- vs F-R+.
Each trial followed the same structure. The transfer tube with the token was presented,
along with the fishing rod. Alongside were given two types of objects (five of each). The chil-
dren were instructed to choose five of the 10 objects to use ‘later’ to try to obtain the token
from the transfer tube. The selected objects were put on the side in an egg box. Importantly,
the use of the selected objects did not take place immediately after selection, so as to prevent
any learning/feedback that would influence the following choices. Each choice-trial was unique
and no choice was repeated.
Once they had made all six choices, children had the opportunity to try to retrieve the
token six times using the objects that they have previously selected.
At the end of the choice phase, the children collected the stickers that they had won during
the experiment and were instructed not to discuss the “game” they had been playing with their
classmates.
Analysis
Structure of the data. For each child and for each of the six choice trials, the number of
each type of objects chosen by the children was recorded. Each of these would be out of a pos-
sible total of 5.
Models. We defined five different models representing distinct patterns of behaviour. For
each model, we highlight a particular type of information, or combination of information-
types, that could drive behaviour, and predict which objects should be chosen if relying solely
on this information and choosing perfectly. As such, these five models give predictions as to
what a theoretical child would choose if they were basing their decisions purely on reward-his-
tory, functionality information, or a particular combination of the two.
By comparing the actual choices made by the participants to the predictions for each
model, we can calculate a degree of fit for each model to observed behaviour. By comparing
the relative fit of different models, we can thereby assess which model/s provide the best statis-
tical fit for the children’s choices. This should allow us to infer which informational factors
(reward-history or functionality) most contribute to decision-making in this task. It is not pos-
sible to directly compare the model predictions to each individual choice made by each child.
However, we can estimate how well that child’s pattern of choices across the 6 unique choice-
trials fit each model’s predictions. To do so, we establish a reference point for each model: A
‘perfect’ score obtained by only selecting the objects based on that model. Then we assess the
degree to which the score obtained by the children fits with that reference point. The degree of
fit gives an indication of the consistency with which this information influences behaviour. It
is possible for a particular model to be the best fit of the 5 available models, but still have a low
level of fit. This would suggest that the child’s decision-making is not consistently reliant on
any particular type of information, but that one type of information has more influence than
the others. Conversely, if a child’s behaviour has a very high level of fit with a particular model,
this may suggest that the child is explicitly relying on a particular form on information, or fol-
lowing a strategy with a specific weighting of both types of information (such as, rely on func-
tionality information where it is available, where it isn’t, go with whatever was previously
rewarded).
Different models emphasise different factors or a combination of factors that may influence
children’s choices. The ‘Function Only’ model (F) considers only functionality information. A
child 100% fitting this model would take into account only whether or not the objects are func-
tional in the context of a water displacement task. Whether using the object has previously led
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to actually obtaining a reward would be disregarded. In choices where both types of items
share the same functionality, the participant would choose at random. The ‘Reward-Only’
model (R), considers only reward information. A child 100% fitting this model would only
take into account the experience of having been previously rewarded for using an object.
Whether the objects are functional in the context of a water displacement task would be disre-
garded. In choices where both types of items share the same reward history, the participant
would choose at random. The ‘Function then Reward’ model (F -> R) gives precedence to the
object’s functionality over the experience of having been rewarded. A child 100% fitting this
model would always choose the more functional object where this choice was available. How-
ever, when given a choice between two equally functional or non-functional objects that differ
in their reward history, the previously rewarded object would be preferred. The ‘Reward then
Function’ model (R -> F) prioritises the experience of having been rewarded over object func-
tionality. A child 100% fitting this model would always choose the previously rewarded object
where this choice was available. However, when given a choice between two equally rewarded
objects which differ in functionality, the functional object would be preferred. Finally, the
‘Causal Link’ model (CL) predicts that the child does not rely on functionality or reward his-
tory alone but instead on how familiar they are with the relationship between insertion and
reward outcome. In two of the four conditions (F+R+ and F-R-) that use standard containers,
the relationship is not affected by outside influence and therefore might be considered more
‘expected’. Solid, sinking objects raise the water, making it easy to reach the token; hollow
items or floating props do not displace liquids, leading to an unrewarded trial. However, in the
other two conditions (F-R+ and F+R-) using always-rewarded or never-rewarded containers,
the link between item insertion and reward outcome is influenced by external factors and
therefore possibly less familiar and straightforward. Instead, the outcome is tied to the inter-
vention of the experimenter or the design of the container. It is possible that in the F+R+ and
F-R- conditions, participants may be able to form an understanding of the objects and to pre-
dict how they will behave in the transfer tube used in the choice phase, using previous experi-
ences to guide their judgements. However, it is conceivable that such understanding and
prediction couldn’t be formed for the items used in F+R- and F-R+ conditions, leading the
children to be uncertain of the consequences of their insertion. A child 100% fitting this model
therefore would therefore rely on actively choosing F+R+ and rejecting F-R- whenever possi-
ble, but in cases where F+R- objects are opposed to F-R+ items, the participant would choose
at random.
Data preparation. The reference score for each model (the perfect score obtained only by
selecting the objects based on that model) was created through three steps. First, we establish
which choice trials should be considered for each model (Table 1). If the model predicts ran-
dom choice for a given choice trial (i.e. a trial that opposes two objects that are equally likely to
be picked according to this model, such as two previously rewarded objects for the “reward-
only” model, see Table 1), this trial isn’t taken into account in the establishment of the refer-
ence score. This is because the model cannot predict what “random choice” might be for each
individual. Then, for each choice trial, we determine which type of objects should be chosen
according to the model. For each choice, this type of object is given a score of 5/5. Finally, the
scores are summed across all the appropriate choice trials to give the reference score. Each
choice-trial therefore contributes specific information to the reference score, without duplica-
tion or redundancy. Each model possesses its own reference score, which is to be compared to
the actual choices made by the children.
To do this comparison, for each child and for each of the five models, an “observed” score
is created based on the actual objects chosen by the participant, with regard to the predictions
of the model. The observed score for each child and each model is created using the same
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choice trials used to establish the reference score for that particular model. As such, we do not
consider behaviour in trials where the model would predict random choice. For each trial, we
identify how many of the items predicted to be chosen by the model were in fact chosen by the
child. For example, if the model predicts for a particular choice that the functional item should
be chosen, and a child chooses 3 of the functional items and 2 of the non-functional items, the
observed score for that choice would be 3/5 for that model. These scores are then summed
across all relevant choices for that model. This process produces 5 observed scores for each
child–one for each model.
For each model, observed scores are then compared to the reference scores to give a mea-
sure of model-fit. This measure quantifies how well the participant’s behaviour is consistent
with that predicted by the model. A score of 100% means that a child chose all the objects
expected to be picked according to that model. In the example given above, the child would
have a model-fit of 60% for that model. Statistical analysis is then conducted on upon these
measures of model-fit.
The models assessed are not completely independent from one another: the way the refer-
ence scores are created means that there is an overlap, especially between closely related mod-
els. For example, the choices that children are predicted to make by the “function only” model
are close to the ones predicted by the “function then reward” model. This means that a child’s
behaviour may be equally well described by multiple models.
Finally, the number of children whose behaviour perfectly or near-perfectly (over 95%) fit
each model was recorded. These children might be said to be relying exclusively on a particular
form of information. While the general model-fit analysis will assess the relative influence of
different types of information on choices statistically, this analysis will explore how many indi-
vidual children are committed to a single information type or combination. This will allow for
differentiation between situations in which, for example, 100% of children are 50% influenced
by reward history, or whether 50% of children are 100% influenced, while 50% of children are
not influenced at all.
Results
Children’s scores were normally distributed, as assessed by Shapiro-Wilk’s test, except for the
“Function only” (p = 0.02) and “Reward only” (p = 0.028) models in 9 year-olds and the “Func-
tion only” model in 10 year olds (p = 0.03). Where data were normally distributed, parametric
tests were conducted.
Table 1. Predicted choices for each model.
CHOICE FUNCTION ONLY
(F)
REWARD ONLY (R) FUNCTION THEN REWARD
(F -> R)
REWARD THEN FUNCTION
(R -> F)
CAUSAL LINK (CL)
F+R+ VS F-R- F+R+ F+R+ F+R+ F+R+ F+R+
F+R+ VS F+R- Random- Not
considered
F+R+ F+R+ F+R+ F+R+
F+R+ VS F-R+ F+R+ Random- Not
considered
F+R+ F+R+ F+R+
F+R- VS F-R+ F+R- F-R+ F+R- F-R+ Random- Not
considered
F+R- VS F-R- F+R- Random- Not
considered
F+R- F+R- F+R-
F-R+ VS F-R- Random- Not
considered
F-R+ F-R+ F-R+ F-R+
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0193264.t001
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Are children’s choices distinguishable from random?
The first analysis explores whether or not children in each age group made choices in a way
that is distinguishable from random. This will also validate our model-based approach to data
analysis. One sample t-tests were used to compare the model-fit of each age group with each
model to chance (50%). The results indicate that behaviour of the four-year olds cannot be dis-
tinguished from random (Fig 3). However, older children all demonstrated behaviour that fit
with at least one model (Table 2).
Which model/s best fit children’s choices?
Data were analysed using a mixed-model design ANOVA with within-subject factors of model
and between subject factors of counterbalancing group, age-group and gender. Mauchly’s test
indicated a violation of the assumption of Sphericity (X2(2) = 543.623, p = 0.000); therefore,
degrees of freedom were corrected using Greenhouse-Geisser estimates of Sphericity
(eta = 0.330). Level of model-fit was significantly influenced by age group (F(6, 113) = 5.493,
p<0.001, eta = 0.226), counterbalancing group (F(3,113) = 3.100, p = 0.030, eta = 0.076) and
model (F(1.318, 148.981) = 36.029, p<0.001). In addition, there was a significant interaction
Fig 3. Percentage of objects chosen that fit with each model.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0193264.g003
Table 2. Difference from random choice for each model across age groups.
Model 4-YO 5-YO 6-YO 7-YO 8-YO 9-YO 10+-YO
F t(20) = 1.759,
p = 0.094
t(28) = 1.593,
p = 0.1222
t(32) = 2.354,
p = 0.024
t(33) = 6.193,
p<0.001
t(18) = 4.256,
p<0.001
Wilcoxen p<0.001 Wilcoxen p<0.001
R t(20) = 0.585,
p = 0.565
t(30) = 2.238,
p = 0.033
t(31) = 3.285,
p = 0.002
t(31) = 3.427,
p = 0.001
t(18) = 1.899,
p = 0.073
Wilcoxen p = 0.022 t(23) = 3.217,
p = 0.003
F -> R t(20) = 1.394,
p = 0.179
t(30) = 1.830,
p = 0.77
t(33) = 2.447,
p = 0.019
t(33) = 6.849,
p<0.001
t(18) = 4.531,
p<0.001
t(18) = 5.875,
p<0.001
t(23) = 9.813,
p<0.001
R -> F t(20) = 1.539,
p = 0.140
t(29) = 3.620,
p = 0.001
t(33) = 2.329,
p = 0.026
t(30) = 6.325,
p<0.001
t(17) = 3.221,
p = 0.005
t(18) = 5.016,
p<0.001
t(23) = 7.66,
p<0.001
CL t(20) = 1.559,
p = 0.135
t(30) = 2.470,
p = 0.019
t(32) = 2.258,
p = 0.03
t(33) = 7.429,
p<0.001
t(18) = 4.216,
p<0.001
t(18) = 5.875,
p<0.001
t(23) = 9.275,
p<0.001
Shaded cells indicate behaviour not distinguishable from random choice.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0193264.t002
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between age-group and model (F(7.910, 148.981) = 5.060, p<0.001) suggesting that which
model best fit children’s choices was different in different age-groups (Fig 3).
Paired sampled t-tests were then conducted to assess the relative fit of each model to chil-
dren’s choices in each age group. As shown by the previous analysis, none of the available
models provided a good fit for the behaviour of 4-year-old children. Among 5-year-olds, no
model provided a significantly better fit than any other, with the exception of the “causal link”
model which predicted behaviour significantly better than the “reward only” model (t(30) =
-2.486, p = 0.019). Among 6-year-olds, no model provided a significantly better fit than any
other. At the age of 7, all models provided a significantly better fit than the “Reward Only”
model (F: t(31) = 3.268, p = 0.002; F then R: t(31) = -3.227, p = 0.002; R then F: t(28) = -3.686,
p<0.001; CL: t(31) = -4.635, p<0.001). “Causal Link” was also significantly more predictive
than “Reward then Function” (t(30) = -3.637, p = 0.001). However, no single model was the
‘best’ fit. At the age of 8, function based models (“Function only” and “Function then Reward”)
provided a significantly better fit than reward based models (“Reward only” and “Reward then
Function”; F vs R: t(18) = 2.518, p = 0.021; F vs R then F: t(17) = 2.716, p = 0.014; F then R vs
R: t(18) = -2.751, p = 0.013; F then R vs R then F: t(17) = 3.341, p = 0.003). There was no signif-
icant difference between the two function-based models or between the two reward-based
models. The “Causal Link” model was a better fit than the reward-based models (R: t(18) =
-2.89, p = 0.009; R then F: t(17) = -4.258, p<0.0010) but not significantly different to the func-
tion based models. At the age of 9, the “Function only” model provided a significantly better fit
than all other models except for “Causal Link” (F vs R: t(18) = 3.598, p = 0.002; F vs R then F:
t(18) = 3.307, p = 0.003; F vs F then R: t(18) = 3.135, p = 0.005). Both the “Function the reward”
and “Reward then Function” models provided a better fit than the “Reward Only” models (F
then R: t(18) = -3.43, p = 0.002; R then F: t(18) = -3.726, p = 0.001) and the “Function then
Reward” model was a better fit than “Reward then Function” (t(18) = 2.605, p = 0.017). “Causal
Link” was a better predictor of behaviour than the reward-based models but not significantly
different to the function based models (CL vs R: t(18) = -4.585, p<0.001; CL vs R then F: t(18) =
-4.485, p<0.001). Finally, at the age of 10+, the “Function Only” model provided a significantly
better fit to children’s behaviour than all other models. (F vs R: t(23) = 6.496, p<0.001; F vs R
then F: t(23) = 4.936, p<0.001; F vs F then R: t(23) = 6.52, p<0.001; F vs CL: t(23) = 4.154,
p<0.001). All models were significantly better predictors than the reward based models (R vs
F then R: t(23) = -6.848, p = 0; R vs CL: t(23) = -7.839, p<0.001; R then F vs. CL: t(23) = -9.042,
p<0.001). Finally, the “Reward then Function” model was a better fit than the “Reward Only”
model (t(23) = -5.87, p<0.001).
These results suggest that the older the child, the closer their behaviour can be fit to a func-
tion-based model, such that by the age of 10, the best predictor of behaviour is a model that
considers only information pertaining to functionality and ignores reward-history entirely.
How many children fit the models perfectly?
The final analysis explores how many children’s behaviour was a perfect or near-perfect fit
with that predicted by the models, and how this differs across age groups. To do so, we selected
only children who selected 95% or more of the objects predicted by the model. Such children
might be said to exclusively base their choices on a particular type or combination of informa-
tion types described by one of the models. For example, their choices may be guided solely by
reward history, that is, over 95% of their choices fit those predicted by the “reward only”
model. We then assessed how this number of children differs according to age.
The number of children whose behaviour perfectly or near-perfectly fit at least one model
significantly increased over time (Chi-Square, X2(6) = 223.708, p<0.001; Fig 4). The behaviour
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of older children was significantly more likely to perfectly fit the “Function Only” model than
that of younger children (Chi-Square, X2(6) = 21.583, p = 0.001; Table 3). This age effect was
not observed for any of the other models: Reward (Chi-Square, X2(6) = 5.490, p = 0.483),
Function then Reward (Chi-Square, X2(6) = 4.564, p = 0.601), Reward then Function (Chi-
Square, X2(6) = 5.490, p = 0.483), Causal Link (Chi-Square, X2(6) = 6.815, p = 0.338). Thus
only functionality information significantly changed in its tendency to exclusively drive behav-
iour with age.
Discussion
This study aimed to explore the relative contribution of associative learning and causal reason-
ing to learning in the Aesop’s fable task in 4–11 year old children. Our findings suggest that
the behaviour of children above the age of four can be modelled using reward and functionality
information in isolation and different combinations. However, the specific model which pro-
vided the best fit for children’s choices differed between age groups. In younger participants
(aged 5-6-years), there was no single model that best predicted behaviour. This may suggest
that children of this age vary in how the approach the task, or that each child’s decision making
is influenced by several types of information. By age 7, a pattern begins to emerge in which
solely reward-based model falls behind in its ability to predict children’s behaviour. This pat-
tern is cemented by age 8, when function-based significantly outstrip reward-based models. By
age 10, the model that best fits behaviour is that which includes only functionality information
and ignores reward information entirely.
Fig 4. Percent of children choosing over 95% of objects predicted by a given model.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0193264.g004
Table 3. Percentage of children of each age group following a given model more than 95% of the time.
MODEL 4-YO 5-YO 6-YO 7-YO 8-YO 9-YO 10+-YO
F 10 6.5 5.7 17.6 15.8 42.1 37.5
R 0 0. 2.9 0 0. 5.2 0
F -> R 4.8 1.4 2.9 5.9 5.3 15.8 8.3
R -> F 0 0 2.9 0 0 5.3 0
CL 4.8 3.2 5.7 5.9 5.3 21.1 8.3
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0193264.t003
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Notably, in no age-group did the percentage of children whose choices fit a particular
model by over 95% exceed 50%. This suggests that it is not the case that the majority of chil-
dren in particular age-group opt for the same information-type that guides all their choices.
There is, instead, a spread of information being used by children in each age-group. Nonethe-
less, across all age groups, the number of children opting to rely heavily on reward history (as
predicted by the “reward only” or “reward then function” models) remains consistently low,
while the number whose decisions rely entirely on functionality information (as predicted by
the “function only” model) increases steadily with age, from around 15% of 4-year-olds to 58%
in 9-year-olds 45% in 10-year-olds. This result might be taken to suggest that the change over
time results from an increased tendency to rely on functionality information, rather than a
decline in reward-based learning. While these figures suggest that decisions based on function-
ality information are the most common, this still leaves 42% and 55% of children in these
respective age-groups not consistently relying on either type of information. While some of
these are behaving in a manner consistent with the “causal-link” model, one striking change
with age is the percentage of children whose behaviour does not fit any particular model. This
decreases from around 80% of 4-year-olds to around 10% of 9-year-olds (although this then
increases to 45% of 10-year olds, this is still lower than younger age groups). This suggests that
there may be two changes that are occurring across the age range. Firstly that older children
are more likely to choose exclusively according to particular information-type (although not
all do so); and secondly that functionality information increases in its influence over choices as
children get older, but only for around a third of children does it necessarily become the only
type of information used.
Our findings broadly support the hypothesis that children’s behaviour starts to become
markedly influenced by information about functionality when learning about cause-effect rela-
tionships at around the age of 7–8, at least in the context of the Aesop’s Fable task. This fits
with previous literature suggesting that reliable performance on complex tool-use tasks
emerges at around 8 years [3, 23–27]. This is also the age at which, when asked “why” some-
thing worked, children spontaneously give mechanism-based answers, rather than simply
describing the cause-effect relationship [3]. That all three of these performance markers occur
at the same age may suggest that first-trial success on the Aesop’s fable task requires function-
ality understanding. However, this does not mean that a comprehension of functionality is
required to learn to perform successfully in such tasks over several trials.
The present study investigates the information emphasised by an individual after only a sin-
gle trial (or 5 experiences) with each object. During the choice phase, children made 30 indi-
vidual choices from 6 pairs of object-types, however they were not permitted to insert any of
the objects until after all choices were made and therefore could not learn about the result of
these choices. An interesting follow-up to this study would be to investigate if this information
can be used to understand whether learning in a standard Aesop’s fable task requires function-
ality understanding in children. We know from previous research that 5–7 year olds are able
to learn an Aesop’s fable task over the course of 3–5 trials [3, 23]. However, these analyses were
conducted at the age-group level, and significant individual differences were evident in chil-
dren’s ability to learn the task. It is possible that the type of information emphasised by an indi-
vidual in the first trial of exposure may be predictive of their ability to learn a standard task
over the course of several trials. To give an example, in the present study, the number of
6-year-olds whose behaviour could be predicted by a model was split relatively evenly between
the different types of model. It is possible that were these same children to go on to experience
5 trials of a standard Aesop’s fable task, only those who initially emphasised functionality
information would be able to learn the task. This would suggest that it is not only first-trial suc-
cess that requires functionality understanding, but that learning over several trials is similarly
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dependant on causal reasoning. Alternatively, since any of these models could in theory pro-
duce successful behaviour (because of the confounding of function and reward in standard
Aesop’s Fable paradigms), it might be that children whose behaviour fit any of the models
would all learn equally, this would suggest that the same task can be learned using a variety of
types of information. Finally, it is possible that added experience might lead children to alter
the types of the information they use, and that this adjustment allows them to perform
successfully.
One notable distinction between the older and younger children in this sample was that the
behaviour of the youngest children as a group was not able to be modelled by any of the
defined models, and only a low percentage of children in these younger age groups perfectly or
near-perfectly fit any particular model. This may suggest that the design of the current study
did not allow for sufficient experience of either functionality or reward information to allow
younger children to learn. During the exploration phase, children had 5 experiences of each
object interacting with water. From a functionality perspective, inserting a functional object
always lead to water being displaced upwards, even if the reward ultimately did not come
closer to the top. Conversely, when non-functional objects were rewarded, the mechanism by
which they were so was very clearly external and not connected to the items’ intrinsic proper-
ties (e.g. addition of water through a syringe). More trials may have possibly led to an increased
exposure to these cause-effect relationships, helping the younger children to form an under-
standing of the functionality of the objects and supporting the use of this information to guide
decision making.
From a reward perspective, the amount of information regarding object-reward associa-
tions that children receive depends on the specific nature of the associative learning involved.
During rewarded trials, for each object type, a single reward was received after 5 objects were
inserted into the tube. A simple associative account would therefore suggest that the children
had, for each object, a single experience of an object-reward association at a 5:1 ratio. By most
associative accounts this would be insufficient experience to allow an association to be formed
[28]. However, both Taylor and colleagues [29] and Cheke and colleagues [7] have argued that
the performance of corvids in Aesop’s fable and string pulling tasks may rely on learning via
perceptual-motor feedback or “incremental conditioning”. While each action (object inser-
tion, pulling motion) does not immediately result in obtaining the reward, it does bring it
closer. The authors argue that it is the approach of the reward–rather than obtaining it–that
reinforces the behaviour. Indeed, when the action-reward ratio is maintained but the move-
ment of the reward is removed, animals in such studies become unable to learn [29, 30]. In the
present study, after each object-drop, the reward was either located in (or close to) its original
position, or it rested detectably closer than it previously had. Even in F-R+ trials, the reward
moved after ever object-drop, despite the fact that this movement was not physically caused by
the object itself. The perceptual-motor feedback account would suggest therefore that in
rewarded trials the children had 5 experiences of a 1:1 action-reward ratio (compared with
around 25 experiences in [3]). Interestingly, recent findings by Miller, Jelbert and colleagues
[31] suggest that performance of 4–9 year-old children on the Aesop’s fable task is not reliant
on the movement of the reward: Learning is maintained even when the tube is opaque and
movement cannot be observed. However, this does not mean that they did not rely on object-
reward associations, as children were still rewarded. It may, however, suggest that any poten-
tial associative learning in this task, at least in children, is more likely to be reinforced by the
receipt, rather than the movement, of the reward.
Providing extra training trials may facilitate learning in 4–7 year-old children, but it could
also influence the nature of what is learned. Indeed, exploring the effect of training duration
on learning could in itself be a valuable focus for future research. It is possible that increasing
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the number of exploration trials may lead to a preference for reward-based learning over the
use of function information, especially in older children in whom both options are available.
Such a dose-dependent effect of training on learning style can be seen in the progression of
instrumental conditioning from goal-directed to habit-based: a small amount of training
results in responding that is flexible and goal-oriented, while extended training results in
responding that is inflexible and reflexive (e.g. [32]). Such an investigation would be useful not
only in understanding how causal learning progresses in different circumstances, but also in
identifying the best teaching strategy to promote function-based learning in school children.
That a different amount of training might skew participants towards adopting function or
reward-based decisions raises the important question of whether an individual must rely on a
single type of information in all situations. Cheke and colleagues [3] demonstrated that when
presented with an “impossible” cause-effect relationship, children of around 8 years of age
were able to solve the problem using reward information. Importantly, this was despite these
individuals clearly attempting to apply functionality-based reasoning in their verbal descrip-
tions of the task. This may suggest that children of a certain age have the flexibility to integrate
or switch between the types of information they emphasise when making causal decisions.
This would help explain why only a relatively small percentage of children followed a given
type of information completely. However, given that older children are able to use reward
information, the low level of fit with reward-based models, alongside the relatively strong
influence of function information implies that older children may be biased their learning
towards functionality information. As such, it is possible that children of younger ages are
capable of understanding about functionality, but that what increases is a tendency to empha-
size this information. Older children may be specifically motivated to seek functionality infor-
mation when learning in new situations, while younger children may incorporate information
into their learning in a less targeted manner. While “functionality” and “reward” learning have
been presented here as if mutually exclusive, it is likely that any given individual could conceiv-
ably learn and be influenced by both types of information. If human adults were unable to
learn reward associations in the absence of functionality understanding, we could not take
advantage of reliable contingencies that are based on mechanisms beyond our understanding.
As such, future studies incorporating both detectable and undetectable mechanisms would be
informative as to the development of the ability not only to use specific types of information,
but also to switch between them at need.
Implications for non-human animals
The current research has focused on cause-effect learning in children, yet the majority of stud-
ies utilising the Aesop’s fable paradigm have been conducted with non-human animals, and in
particular with members of the corvid (crow) family. As recently reviewed by Jelbert and col-
leagues [8], variants of the Aesop’s fable task have now been used to assess causal understand-
ing in 4 species of corvids: Rooks [2], Eurasian jays [7], New Caledonian crows [4, 5, 9, 23] and
California scrub jays [33], as well as one non-corvid bird species (great-tailed grackles [34]).
While success rates vary between species and across specific tests, birds’ performance on
both substrate-choice and object-choice Aesop’s fable tasks suggest an impressive ability to
learn which option is likely to be more successful in allowing them to retrieve a floating food
reward. However, as with the developmental data, debate remains as to what is learned by
non-human animals performing these experiments.
Previous research suggests that birds’ learning in the Aesop’s fable task is at an equivalent
level to children of around 5-7-years [3]. However, direct comparison of performance is lim-
ited by differences in methodology and analysis between inter-species studies. As Miller and
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colleagues [23] observe, children tend to be given 3–5 trials in which to learn, and are assessed
at the level of the age group, while birds tend to be given 15–20 trials, and are assessed at the
level of the individual. When corvid and child data are analysed in the same way, birds appear
to learn at a speed most redolent of 5-year-olds [8]. However, as reviewed above, it is not clear
what type of information is required for learning over several trials. Furthermore, two individ-
uals learning at the same rate does not imply they necessarily acquire the same information.
While it may be the case that children do not solve the task using associative reward-based
learning, it remains true that the task could in principle be solved using such an approach. Chil-
dren and birds may well solve the same task, at the same speed, but in completely different
ways.
In order to relate the current findings to corvids, it would be necessary to carry out an
equivalent study within that population. Miller and colleagues [23] conducted a similar experi-
ment, using a cut-down design that included only one of the F+R- (leaky) and F-R+ (syringe)
conditions. In the exploration phase, birds were given 30 training trials with these object-con-
text combinations before being presented with the same objects and a “standard” (unmodi-
fied) water tube in the choice phase. Over 5 choice trials, the birds picked significantly more
non-functional, previously rewarded tools than functional, previously unrewarded tools, sug-
gesting that they were responding more to reward history than functionality. However, the
F+R-/F-R+ choice is the most challenging distinction, with a forced choice between function
and reinforcement. As such, during training, the choice of a functional object would never
have led to a reward. This would make it highly unlikely for the birds to adopt a function-
based strategy even were they capable of doing so. Furthermore, this experiment took place
immediately after another study in which birds received extensive training linking similar
non-functional tools with reward. The birds were also given considerably more training than
the children during the exploration phase. As discussed above, it is not known how this ele-
ment may influence the development of different learning different types of information.
Nonetheless, these findings may suggest that corvids may be more likely to solve the Aesop’s
fable task using reward history.
Caveats and limitations
As with any empirical study, interpretation of the current results rests upon several assump-
tions. First of all, how much the current findings can be generalised will depend on the degree
to which the children assessed can be considered representative of a larger sample, and are
comparable to those previously tested on other causal reasoning tasks. Another particular
source of concern when dealing with any population, but particularly with school children, is
the manner and extent to which previous learning plays a role in task performance. In particu-
lar, there is a concern that the performance of children of a certain age stems from having
been actively taught water displacement during science lessons. This potential confound
makes it particularly difficult to provide direct comparisons between children and non-human
species. While it is possible, and in fact highly likely, that children are taught about water dis-
placement at some stage of the school career, it is improbable they have directly associated this
phenomenon with the experience of being rewarded. Rather, the choices that children would
be likely to make by relying only on the knowledge that they may have previously learned
about sinking and floating objects are predicted by the causal link model. This model however
was never the best predictor of children’s choices, no matter the age. Were they to rely on aca-
demic knowledge to pass these tasks, one would also expect children at a particular point of
progression in the school curriculum (which was shared by all participants in this study) to
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suddenly display a marked difference in the way they perform. However, subjects’ reliance on
functionality shows a relatively steady progression with increasing age.
As with any cognitive test, performance on the Aesop’s fable task is likely to differ according
not only to individual variation in the cognitive ability of interest, but also in overarching
skills. ‘Executive function’ is an umbrella term encompassing a number of related abilities
including inhibitory control, working memory and the “organisational strategies necessary to
prepare a response” ([35], p.283). Executive functions exhibit a protracted development
throughout childhood and adolescence (e.g. [36]), with preschool-age children struggling in
particular with inhibitory control and response inflexibility. Difficulties with inhibition have
been previously discussed in the context of the Aesop’s fable task as a possible limiting factor
in performance in corvids relative to children [23]. An individual with poor or immature
inhibitory control may have sufficient cognitive understanding to choose the correct action or
tool, but fail to behave appropriately due to difficulty refraining from a prepotent response.
Such an account may be relevant not only to differences in performance between children and
non-human animals, but between children of different ages. In the current study, it is possible
that the 4-year-olds did not differ from random or fit with a particular model not due to a lack
of understanding but because of their well-documented difficulty in inhibiting impulsive
responses [37, 38].
Another challenge to executive function in the present study was the need to bring together
information from multiple sources to guide decision-making. Perner and colleagues [39]
argue that 3-4-year-old children’s tendency towards inflexible behaviour in cognitive tasks
may stem from a failure to understand that a stimulus or situation can be considered from dif-
ferent perspectives or according to different dimensions. As such they may find it difficult to
integrate or separate information about functionality and reward in order to guide decision
making, despite potentially understanding each element individually. Finally, the paradigm
used in this experiment may have put particular demands on working and long-term memory.
Children were required to remember a number of experiences with different objects and con-
tainers during the exploration phase in order to make the appropriate decision during the
choice phase. While every effort was made to reduce this demand, such as representing the
objects, containers and reward with picture cards throughout the study, it is still possible that
this memory demand may have disproportionately affected younger children. Memory diffi-
culties may therefore have limited the degree to which 4-5-year olds were able to use the avail-
able information in their choices.
While limitations in executive functions may explain why the youngest children in the sam-
ple did not demonstrate behaviour consistent with any model, it cannot account for the types
of information used by the older children. It is very unlikely that failures of inhibition, infor-
mation organisation or working memory would bias children’s responding in the direction of
functionality-based decision making. More likely, issues with executive function, and inhibi-
tion in particular, would be likely to bias an individual towards reward-based associative learn-
ing, which makes fewer demands on executive functions. This account may explain the
apparently reward-based responding seen in corvids on a comparable experiment [23].
Finally, the utility of these findings is dependent on the degree to which Aesop’s fable tasks
are representative measures of physical cognition, and to what extent such tasks–or indeed
tool-use tasks in general—are representative tests of causal learning as a broader concept.
As such, a triangulation approach using a range of tasks and paradigms would be useful to
understand how causal learning progresses in different tasks, and from a domain-general per-
spective. The area of social cognition may provide many relevant insights. Here too, the mech-
anistic association between cause and effect can be manipulated independently from reward
by the use of scenarios in which a reward would have been achieved had the context been
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different. Call and colleagues [40] investigated whether apes were able to distinguish between
the intentions of different human keepers even if the result of their behaviours were matched.
The authors manipulated the behaviour of human keepers such that both denied the chimpan-
zees food, but one did so through “clumsiness” while the other intentionally withheld their
gifts. They found that while neither keeper had actually given the animal food, chimpanzees
showed preference for the individual who seemed like they would have given food had circum-
stances played out differently, i.e. if the context had been different. It would be theoretically
possible to adapt such a design to explore comprehensively the relative contribution of func-
tionality and reward-based learning to social causality.
In summary, our findings suggest that children’s choices on the Aesop’s fable task can be
modelled using reward and function information from around the age of 5, years of age and
that from the age of around 8 functionality-based models provide the best fit for children’s
behaviour. By the time children reach the age of 10 models exclusively emphasising functional-
ity information outstrip all other models. Models emphasising reward-history did not explain
children’s choice behaviour at any age. These findings are in line with previous research suggest-
ing that children begin to consistently pass complex tool-use tasks at around the age of 8, but
require several trials in order to learn before this time. While some children, particularly in
older age groups, relied exclusively on functional information, many children did not, suggest-
ing that the influence of functional information may be more in the form of a decision-bias,
rather than an exclusive strategy. Given that previously literature suggests that children within
the age range tested can use associative learning of reward associations, the fact that they empha-
sise functionality information may suggest that children develop a tendency to seek and empha-
sise functionality information when learning in new situations, biasing their choices. Whether
this tendency is the result of a natural bias or education is not clear, however it is plausible that
such a bias would be vital in facilitating the development of adult-level causal reasoning.
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